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Public communication policies in an international economy: What should policymakers reveal?
1 : Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan
École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan
We study non-cooperative communication games being played by policymakers in an international economy. Each policymaker receives signals on the real idiosyncratic shocks which affect the country economies. It has the choice of revealing or not the received signals. The model is characterized by a beauty contest argument in the utility function and cross-border real spillovers. The non-cooperative equilibrium is never characterized by no revelation. A full transparency outcome may be the equilibrium outcome and is then Pareto-optimal. From a normative point of view, no revelation may be Pareto-optimal: the social value of public information may be negative in international economies as well as in closed economies. Partial revelation schemes are possible outcomes but never Pareto-optimal. We apply our result to an international monetary game
