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Dynamic common-value contests
Toomas Hinnosaar  1@  
1 : Collegio Carlo Alberto  -  Website
Via Real Collegio 30 10024 Moncalieri -  Italy

In this paper, I study dynamic common-value contests. Agents arrive over time and expend efforts to compete for prizes that are allocated proportionally according to efforts exerted. This model can be applied to a number of examples, including rent-seeking, lobbying, advertising, and R&D competitions. I provide a full characterization of equilibria in dynamic common-value contests and use it to study their properties, including comparative statics, earlier-mover advantage, and large contests. I show that information about other players' efforts plays an important role in determining the total effort and that the total effort is strictly increasing with the information that becomes available.


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