This paper aims to update the normative analysis of income redistribution by conditioning it on a societal consensus. An inequality-averse social planner must choose a linear income tax schedule while accounting for the possibility that certain policy choices are consonant with the individual social preferences of a plurality of groups in the population, i.e. that they lead to a societal consensus. It is assumed that consensual choices induce ethical labour supply choices, and thus a greater potential for redistribution. The planner's trade-offs may lie between pursuing consensual policies that differ from those otherwise chosen optimally, and retaining its free rein, albeit at the expense of the consensus. In a two skill-type economy, it proves worthwhile for the planner to choose a consensual tax schedule, even if it does not correspond to the optimal choice, as long as it remains moderate. This is more likely the greater is the proportion of high-skilled agents, and the lower is the pre-tax wage inequality.