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After Brexit debates on an own EU-leaving referendum arose in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands too. In this paper, firstly we analyse the possible impacts of the Czech Republic's exit from the EU. Then we observe how the exit of any member state from the union would affect the power distribution of the member states within the EU. From the impacts of a possible leaving we inspect one factor: how the power distribution changes in the Council of the European Union. Because the Treaty of Lisbon specified the decision-making to the number of mem- bers and the population, an exit of a member state does not invoke the renegotiation of the voting weight system. Using the Shapley-Shubik power index, we calculated the power of the member states both with and without the member who might leave the union. Because the actual budget changes in case a member state leaves the union, we adjusted the new power indexes with the change in the budget caused by the leaving of the member state. We found a pattern connected to a change of the threshold of the required member states and the change in power dis- tribution. An exit which causes a change to the member state threshold of the Council of the European Union benefits large, an exit which does not cause such a change benefits small member states.
