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The determination of Public Tuition Fees in a Mixed Education System: A Majority Voting Model
1 : Aix Marseille School of Economics
(AMSE)
Aix Marseilles University, Aix-Marseilles University
2 : Université de Carthage
(ESSAI)
We analyze the issue of majority voting equilibrium for the determination of public tuition fees. We consider a model with mixed education system where public and private universities coexist and compete in tuition fees. Since there is a private alternative, preferences for education are not single-peaked and no single-crossing condition holds. An equilibrium is shown to exist which is one of three types: high tuition fee (the "ends" are a majority), low tuition fee (the "middle" is a majority) or mixed (votes tie). the cost structure determines which equilibrium obtains. The equilibrium tuition is either greater (majority at the ends) or smaller (majority at the middle) than the optimal one.
