Policy Reputation and Political Accountability

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Abstract

We develop a model of electoral competition where both economic policy and politician’s effort affect voters’ payoff. When there is uncertainty regarding policy effectiveness, politicians exert effort to build policy reputation. The concern for policy reputation keeps the incumbent politician accountable on effort dimension, but it cannot eliminate inefficient persistence of policy choice even when cost of changing policy is negligible.

Keywords: Voting; Moral hazard; Political accountability

JEL Codes: D72; D78; O12

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1 Introduction

Electoral competition should provide incentives for the incumbent leader to act in voters’ interests. Electoral competition theory studies two types of incentives. The first case (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986) assumes that voters vote retrospectively and punishes bad behavior by removing poorly performing incumbents from office. Because the electorate rewards good performance with reappointment to office, incumbents are motivated to exert costly effort.

In this type of model, voters use a backward-looking strategy in which they do not change their re-election rule after observing the incumbent’s performance. We call this incentive an explicit incentive because it is similar to the incentive that would have arisen if an explicit performance-contingent contract with full commitment had been given to the incumbent at the beginning of the period. Another type of incentive, which we refer to as implicit incentive, arises when the incumbent’s performance in the current period provides information about variables affecting voters’ payoff in future. This literature starts with Holmstrom’s (1999) seminal work on a managerial incentive problem in a dynamic setting. In this model (Lohmann, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2000: chaps. 4 and 9), popularly known as a career concern model, economic performance signals the incumbent’s competence, and voters reward competence with reelection. To appear more competent and increase the chances of reelection, the incumbent undertakes costly effort. These models do not assume any voter commitment to a specific reelection rule. Instead, voters reelect the incumbent only if the expected payoff from reelecting the incumbent exceeds the expected payoff from not reelecting the incumbent.

Although these theories capture important aspects of reality, each has its own deficiencies. In the retrospective voting model voters are strongly committed to their re-election rule. The career concern model does not take the policy effectiveness into consideration. In reality, voters payoff depends not only on the effort put in by politicians but also on the current policy’s effectiveness. If an economic policy fails to address their interests, voters do not necessarily care less about replacing the policy than electing competent officials. The career concern model does not directly address the role of policy effectiveness, however.

In this paper, we consider an alternate factor that can provide an implicit incentive to leaders to undertake desirable but costly effort: The absence of perfect observability of policy effectiveness. To this end, we analyze a model where both policy and effort affect outcome. Voters can only observe the outcome; they cannot distinguish the impact of the policy from the effort of the politician. Voters can replace a politician by incurring a transition cost. The model assumes that if the incumbent exerts effort, a better economic outcome is more likely under an effective economic policy than an ineffective one. In this scenario, if voters observe a bad outcome, and if they still believe the incumbent has exerted effort, then they would attribute the bad outcome only to a bad economic policy. If the chances of reelection increase with policy effectiveness, the incumbent would exert effort to convince voters that the policy is indeed effective.

We show that the implicit incentive can sustain effort in infinitely repeated game as long as there is some uncertainty regarding the policy effectiveness in every period. Furthermore, given a level of uncertainty about current policy effectiveness, we find an upper limit on the cost of effort such that for any level of cost below that limit, there exists an equilibrium where the incumbent always exerts effort in equilibrium. This equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium if the cost of transition is less than the probability of effectiveness of an untested policy. For a higher range of values of the transition cost, there will be multiple equilibria.
The incumbent however does not change the policy in equilibrium even if the cost of changing the policy is negligible. These results show that even if an implicit incentive can induce incumbents to undertake the costly effort, it fails to motivate them to change a policy when it is not ex ante optimal. Hence, the electorate can never achieve the ex ante first best outcome.

The implicit incentive studied in this article shares similarity with the nature of implicit incentive studied in career concern models. While in the career concern models, the politicians exert effort to build reputation for their hidden type, in this paper, effort is exerted in order to build reputation for a good policy. Unlike career concern models, where the quality of a politician is an intrinsic characteristic, in our model, policy choices can be decided strategically by the politician. To this end, we look at how politician’s payoff changes with ex ante probability of finding a successful policy. We observe that voters’ equilibrium payoff is higher when the probability of finding a successful policy remains at an intermediate range, where as the politician’s payoff increases with the ex ante success probability. Thus, when finding successful policy is relatively easier, politician may lose incentive to exert effort which can adversely affect voter’s payoff.

This paper is organized as follows. In section 1.1, we discuss the related literature. In section 2, we present the model. Section 3 analyzes the model in the two period case, where section 4 analyzes the model in an infinite period setting. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are included in the appendix.

1.1 Related literature

The explicit incentive models described earlier originate from Barro (1973). In Barro, politicians want to maximize rent from holding office. Voters can control incumbent’s behavior by basing the incumbent’s reelection probability on their delivery of social welfare above a threshold. Because politicians desire reappointment, election acts as a disciplinary mechanism to control incumbent behavior. Ferejohn (1986) studies an extended version of this game with exogenous rents from office and costly effort. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) adapt the same model and show how separation of power can induce responsive behavior in the incumbent. Finally, Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) study electoral accountability when voters adopt retrospective voting strategies based on the difference between incumbent’s performance and their initial policy platform.

The literature on implicit incentives draws on Holmstrom’s (1999) career concern model, which is extended by Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a, 1999b) to allow alternative assumptions regarding information structure. Applied in political theory (Persson and Tabellini, 2000), the career concern model assumes candidates maximize the expected value of their competence and studies the role of election as a selection mechanism. Ashworth (2005) considers a similar career concern model with policy uncertainty. In Ashworth, politicians decide how to allocate resources between constituency work and policy work during their tenure. He finds that politicians devote excessive time to constituency work early in their career to affect voters’ learning process; only career concern motivates politicians to exert effort. In this kind of model, information about the candidate’s intrinsic type is revealed through outcome. In my model, on the other hand, voters learn information about economic policy, which the candidate may change if he wishes. Thus, the decision whether to continue with the previous period’s policy and give information about the policy to voters, is a strategic decision by the candidate.
Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) study an electoral accountability model where voters are ill-informed about policy effectiveness. In addition, while voters know that candidates have more accurate information, they are aware that the quality of the information depends upon candidates’ competence levels, which are also their private information. They analyze conditions under which candidates may or may not pander to voters by choosing a popular policy, given their private information about policy effectiveness. Since quality of private information varies across candidates, the election also acts as a selection mechanism. Maskin and Tirole (2004) also study a similar model of executive policy making. Maskin and Tirole study relative efficiency of different constitutional designs, namely, accountable politicians, non-accountable judges, and direct democracy in policy making. In this kind of model, candidates have more information about policy effectiveness than voters have. Candidates sometime pander to voters by following popular policy, even if their private information suggest that the policy could be ineffective. In my model, on the other hand, voters and candidates have the same information. Given the same level of information about policy effectiveness, I address the moral hazard question in a political agency framework.

The most closely related studies on sustaining costly effort for an infinite number of periods are Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Hörner (2003). In Mailath and Samuelson, the agent can occasionally exit the market, but the principal cannot observe this event. Given this kind of imperfect observability, they show that a responsive equilibrium can last for an infinite number of periods. In Hörner, reputation-building behavior arises under persistent competition in which firms’ revenues do not vary continuously with consumer expectation.

2 The Model

Consider a political setup in which a long-lived politician faces a series of elections. In every election, a single voter $V$ decides whether to reelect the incumbent or elect a challenger. In this model, the incumbent is different from a challenger in two aspects: a) The incumbent faces a positive cost to change the existing policy whereas the challenger does not, and b) the voter faces a positive cost if the incumbent is not reelected. I call the first type of cost the persistence cost (denoted by $c_p$) and the second type of cost the transition cost (denoted by $c_t$). Empirical support for policy persistence by the incumbent politicians abounds. There can be several reasons why the incumbent may face a higher cost to change the existing policy than the incumbent. An interpretation for this phenomenon states that the groups benefiting from the current policy make investment in political support by the ruling party, thereby influencing political decision making of the incumbent (Coate and Morris 1999). The transition cost may result from the inefficiency of the new leader, who is still learning the job, or the cost to the voter of supporting a successful campaign to replace the incumbent leader. The voter encounters a trade-off in replacing the incumbent leader: He weighs a transition cost against a cost of continuing an ineffective policy.

Election occurs in discrete time periods indexed by $t \in \{1, 2, \ldots, T\}$. In each period starts with a politician in office (referred as the leader hereafter) who holds office in the current

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1It turns out that the exact value of persistence cost is irrelevant for characterizing the equilibrium outcome. But the assumption that the persistence cost is positive, helps us to avoid possibility of multiple equilibria in situations where the politician’s payoff is the same from continuing the existing policy or from choosing a new policy.
period and faces an election at the end of the period. At the beginning, the leader takes two decisions—He chooses a policy and decides whether or not to serve the office responsibly. The leader can either continue with the existing policy (the one implemented in the last period) or select a new policy.

We assume that there is a persistence cost in implementing a new policy—It is costly to change the existing policy unless it is a new office holder making the change. Specifically, if the leader holds office in the previous period, then he incurs a cost of $c_p$ to change the existing policy, but if the leader holds office in the current period for the first time, then he can choose a new policy at zero cost. The leader’s payoff from holding the office is $b$. He incurs a cost of $c_e > 0$ if he runs the office responsibly. If he is out of office, he gets zero.

The policy and effort result in an outcome $p$. The outcome can be good (G), moderate (M), or bad (B). We consider a single voter who receives utility from the realized outcome. The voter gets 2 units of utility if the outcome is good, 1 unit of utility if the outcome is moderate and 0 units of utility if the outcome is bad. Both the implemented policy and the leader’s effort affect outcome. We model the imperfect observability of policy and effort in the following way.

A policy can either be effective or ineffective. Ex ante, the probability that a new policy would be effective is $\pi \in (0, 1)$. Under an effective policy:

- If the leader serves corruptly, $z = M$
- If the leader serves responsibly, $z = \begin{cases} G & \text{with probability } \mu \\ M & \text{with probability } 1 - \mu \end{cases}$

On the other hand, under an ineffective policy:

- If the leader serves corruptly, $z = B$
- If the leader serves responsibly, $z = \begin{cases} M & \text{with probability } \mu \\ B & \text{with probability } 1 - \mu \end{cases}$

While the parameter $\pi$ reflects the uncertainty surrounding a policy’s effectiveness, the parameter $\mu$ captures how effort can improve the outcome for any given policy.\(^2\)

The temporal game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of period 1 the leader, denoted by $I$, chooses a policy and decides whether to serve responsibly. Then an outcome is realized and everyone observes the outcome. The voter, denoted by $V$, updates his belief regarding the type of the policy chosen in period 1, and decides whether to reelect the incumbent or to elect a challenger, denoted by $C$. The temporal game ends and we move to the following period, in which the temporal game is repeated.

\(^2\)The relation between the policy effectiveness and outcome is modeled in a simple way, so that an extreme outcome (either $G$ or $B$) can provide perfect information about policy effectiveness but an intermediate outcome provides imperfect information. We have also worked out with a richer outcome space (containing finitely many outcomes) and a general class of outcome distribution. The results will hold true under the following three conditions. First, the distribution of outcomes under responsive behavior stochastically (payoff) dominates the distribution of outcomes under corrupt behavior, for any type of policy (effective or ineffective). Second, the distribution of outcomes for an effective policy stochastically (payoff) dominates the distribution of outcomes for an ineffective policy, for any given behavior (responsive or corrupt). And finally, there must be a common set of outcomes that can be realized with strict positive probability under an effective and under an ineffective policy, for any given behavior (responsive or corrupt). The last condition reflects the imperfect observability criterion, assumed throughout the paper. The details are available with the author.
We assume that the leader’s effort is observable only to the leader himself. The Voter observes only outcomes. All players are non-myopic. Players want to maximize the discounted sum of future payoffs where the discount factor is given by $\beta \in (0,1)$. We consider the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strategies. Therefore, the strategy of every player is sequentially rational given other players’ strategies and the belief is updated according to the Bayes’ rule along the equilibrium path.

3 The equilibrium analysis in the game with $T = 2$

In this section, we consider the case in which there are two periods so that the temporal game is played twice. The two period model, though produces an extreme outcome in the second period, can illustrate how imperfect observability allows the voter to commit to a strict reelection strategy, which lead to responsive behavior by the politician. Further, in the two period case, we consider $\beta = 1$ as the discount factor plays no significant role. There are essentially two kinds of equilibrium. In one of these, the incumbent serves responsibly in the first period. In the other, he serves corruptly in the first period. I will call the former $R$–equilibrium, and the latter $C$–equilibrium.

3.1 Equilibrium under perfect observation

To illustrate the role of imperfect observability, let us first consider a hypothetical case in which the voter can perfectly observe the policy’s effectiveness at the end of the first period. Specifically, we assume that in addition to the outcome, the information about policy effectiveness is also observed by all the players at the end of the period (but before election). Since in the final period, whoever runs the office will not take any costly action, the voter only cares about the policy’s effectiveness while deciding whether or not to reelect $I$ at the end of period 1. Moreover, $I$’s actions in the first period cannot affect the voter’s perception of the policy’s effectiveness as the voter can perfectly observe the policy’s outcome. Hence, the incumbent will not take any costly action even in the first period.

Only $C$ equilibrium exists in the perfect observation case. In this $C$ equilibrium, $I$ runs the office corruptly in period 1, and if reelected, he does not change the policy and serves corruptly in period 2. The challenger, if elected, selects a new policy but serves corruptly. The outcome may differ along the equilibrium path, depending on the values of $\pi$ and $c_t$. If $\pi < c_t$, the voter always reelects the incumbent. If $\pi \geq c_t$, then the voter elects the challenger if he observes that the current policy is ineffective.

3.2 Equilibrium under imperfect observation

We now go back to the original information structure and study the case of imperfect observation. In our framework, the voter can observe the policy’s effectiveness only if the policy produces an extreme result. If $o = M$, then V cannot determine whether the outcome stems from an ineffective policy selection or the leader’s corrupt behavior. If the voter expects the incumbent to run the office responsibly, then after observing the moderate outcome $M$, he revises his belief about the policy’s effectiveness following Bayes’ rule:

$$\eta_M = Pr(p = e \mid o = M) = \frac{\pi (1 - \mu)}{\pi (1 - \mu) + \mu (1 - \pi)}.$$
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium outcome. As illustrated in the proof, it can be shown that the voter’s reelection strategy is typically a cutoff strategy. Specifically, if \( V \) reelects the incumbent after certain outcome, he must reelect the incumbent after observing a better outcome. Therefore, \( V \)’s reelection strategy can be one of the following three types: a) A strict reelection strategy, in which \( V \) reelects the incumbent only observing a good outcome; b) a moderate reelection strategy, in which \( V \) reelects the incumbent after observing a moderate or a good outcome; and c) a weak reelection strategy, in which \( V \) reelects the incumbent after observing any outcome. In order to induce responsive behavior by the politician, the voter must be able to follow a reelection strategy where the incumbent can be rejected with positive probability. Therefore, no \( R \)-equilibrium exists with weak reelection strategy. So in order to induce responsive behavior, \( V \) must follow either a strict or a moderate reelection strategy. Further, as the voter cannot commit to a retrospective strategy, it is important that whenever he follows a strict or a moderate reelection strategy, it must be sequentially rational.

Given our simple outcome structure, it can be easily shown that a strict reelection strategy is always sequentially rational in the sense that after observing a good outcome, \( V \) is perfectly informed that the policy is effective. And, it is then optimal for \( V \) to elect the incumbent than a challenger, as long as the incumbent and the challenger behave the same way after election. \( I \) finds incentive to put effort in this situation as long as effort increases the chances of observing the good outcome (which is \( \pi \mu \)) sufficiently as compared to the probability of observing a good outcome under corrupt behavior (which is zero). To see when \( V \) can follow a moderate reelection strategy in equilibrium, notice that \( V \) believes that policy is effective with a probability of \( \eta_M \). On the other hand, by electing a challenger, \( V \) can get a new policy which is likely to be effective with a fixed probability \( \pi \). Thus when \( \eta_M \) is sufficiently high (and in fact higher than \( \pi - c_I \)), \( V \) can commit to a moderate reelection strategy which can be sequentially rational. The politician’s effort incentive comes from the fact that by following a responsive behavior, \( I \) can increase the chances of observing a good or a moderate outcome. Thus two conditions are needed in order to have an equilibrium with responsive behavior. First, \( V \)’s posterior belief about policy effectiveness has to be sufficiently high. And second, more importantly, \( I \) can increase the chances of observing a moderate or a good outcome, by following responsive behavior than by following a corrupt behavior (the difference amounts to \( \mu (1 - \pi) \)). The two effects are missing in the perfect observability case, where posterior beliefs are always perfect, and responsive behavior has no comparative effect in influencing the posterior belief.

Proposition 1. We classify the equilibrium possibilities in the following mutually exclusive cases.

Case 1: If \( \pi - c_I \leq 0 \), the unique equilibrium is a \( C \)-equilibrium. In this equilibrium, \( V \) always reelects the incumbent, and no politician serves responsibly.

Case 2: If \( 0 < \pi - c_I \leq \eta_M \), there is a unique equilibrium, in which \( V \) reelects the incumbent if and only if a good or a moderate outcome is observed. The equilibrium is an \( R \)-equilibrium if \( \frac{b}{c_E} \geq \frac{1}{\mu(1-\pi)} \), or a \( C \)-equilibrium if \( \frac{b}{c_E} < \frac{1}{\mu(1-\pi)} \).

Case 3: If \( 0 \leq \eta_M < \pi - c_I \), an \( R \) equilibrium, in which the voter reelects the incumbent only after observing a good outcome, exists if \( \frac{b}{c_E} \geq \frac{1}{\mu \pi} \). There is no equilibrium in pure strategy if \( \frac{b}{c_E} < \frac{1}{\mu \pi} \).

In any equilibrium, in the second period, if the incumbent is reelected, he continues with the existing policy and serves corruptly. If the challenger is elected, then the challenger selects
a new policy, and serves corruptly.

Proof. In Appendix.

In Figure 1, we plot the equilibrium outcomes for different values of transition cost \( (c_t = 0, 0.2, 0.4) \). It is easy to see that the possibility of \( R \)-equilibrium changes non-monotonically with \( \pi \). We discuss this pattern in the following subsection in detail.

![Figure 1](image)

Interestingly, under imperfect observability, even if the voter does not directly care about the performance in the current period, but he can still induce the politician to behave responsibly because of the policy’s reputational concern. The key to finding responsive behavior is the following: As policy effectiveness is not directly observable, the voter has to infer about it from observing outcome, which carries noisy information about the effectiveness. Given that the voter is willing to approve an effective policy, the politician can influence its reelection possibility by increasing the chances of observing better outcomes through responsive behavior.

3.3 Discussion

The implicit incentive arising from imperfect observability of policy effectiveness is similar to the incentive addressed in the career concern models, where politicians prefers to build reputation for themselves. There is however a crucial difference. In the career concern models, the quality of the politician is an intrinsic characteristic. But in the current framework, policy choice is a decision variable, and we can therefore, address the question of policy selection in presence of reputational concerns.

There are two different ways we can address the question of policy selection. First, we can think of \( \pi \) as the probability of finding a successful policy through experimentation. Both the incumbent and the challenger will have the same success probability, and the variation in \( \pi \) simply reflects variation in success probability among different types of policy domains, such as immigration policy, monetary policy or size of the welfare state etc. Second, another way to treating the policy selection problem is to assume that the politician, through some effort, can possibly increase the chance of finding an effective policy. And thus, politicians will have
preferences over choice of $\pi$, subject to the search cost. In order to address the first question, we need to look at how voter’s and politician’s payoff changes with $\pi$. On the other hand, to address the second question, we fix the challenger’s success probability at a fixed level, say at $\pi_C$, and look at how the incumbent politician’s payoff changes with respect to his own success probability, denoted by $\pi_I$. Analytically, the first approach is a special case of the second approach and it assumes $\pi_I = \pi_C = \pi$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibrium Type</th>
<th>$I$’s Payoff</th>
<th>$V$’s Payoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$C$- equim with weak reelection</td>
<td>$2b$</td>
<td>$2\pi_I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$- equim with moderate reelection</td>
<td>$b + b\pi_I$</td>
<td>$2\pi_I + (1 - \pi_I)(\pi_C - c_t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$- equim with moderate reelection</td>
<td>$b + b\pi_I + b\mu(1 - \pi_I) - c_e$</td>
<td>$2\pi_I + \mu + (1 - \mu)(1 - \pi_I)(\pi_C - c_t)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$- equim with strict reelection</td>
<td>$b + b\mu\pi_I - c_e$</td>
<td>$\pi_I + \mu + \mu\pi_I(1 - \pi_I)(\pi_C - c_t)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 documents the voter’s and the leader’s payoff under the four different types of equilibria. It is easy to compare the payoffs and several comments are in order. First, the leader’s payoff is maximized at the $C$- equilibrium with weak reelection strategy. However, he has little control in inducing $V$ to follow weak reelection strategy. Among the other three types of equilibria, $I$’s payoff is the maximum at the $C$- equilibrium with moderate reelection strategy, followed by the $R$- equilibrium with moderate reelection strategy and $R$- equilibrium with strict reelection strategy. On the other hand, $V$ receives higher payoff in any $R$- equilibria, compared to any $C$- equilibria. $V$’s payoff under $R$- equilibrium with moderate reelection is higher than his payoff with strict reelection if and only if $\eta_M > \pi_C - c_t$. The ranking of the two types of $R$- equilibrium is ambiguous from the voter’s perspective as the voter can make two types of error after observing a moderate outcome — By following a strict reelection strategy, the voter can sometime reject an effective policy, and by following a moderate election strategy the voters can sometime accept an ineffective policy.

Interestingly, as $I$’s payoff is increasing in $\pi_I$, $I$ strictly prefers to choose a policy with as high $\pi$ as possible, subject to the search cost. The effect of such an increase in $\pi$ on voter’s payoff is mixed. Up to a certain range (precisely, till $\frac{1}{c_e} > \frac{1}{\mu(1 - \pi_I)}$), the voter’s payoff increase, and after that, we move to a $C$- equilibrium, where the politician serves office corruptly. This observation implies in policy domains where search cost of finding a successful policy is sufficiently small (or when it changes at a smaller rate even for high values of $\pi$), the voter finds it difficult to induce responsive behavior by the politician even if it is willing to reward a successful policy. On the other hand, if the search cost increases (or the change in search cost increases) at a sufficiently higher rate so that the politician may end up choosing a policy with a moderate (ex ante) success probability, the voter is actually better off as such an uncertain policy may provide the politician with a higher incentive to work hard.

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3We do not incorporate a search cost directly in our model as its effects are easy to infer from our framework. A simple way of including search cost would be to introduce an increasing convex search cost function $c(\pi)$ so that the incumbent will choose a $\pi$ that maximizes $B(\pi) - c(\pi)$ where $B(\pi)$ is the expected payoff function as described in our model. It is easy to see that sufficient convexity would lead to an interior choice of $\pi$. However, just analyzing the characteristic of $B(\pi)$ we can infer how politician’s preference over $\pi$ changes as various parameters change.
The comparative statics with respect to $\pi$ in the case when $\pi_I = \pi_C = \pi$ also shows that voter’s are better off in implementing a responsive equilibrium at an intermediate values of $\pi$. This shows that even if a policy with a higher success probability may be better in terms of improving the average outcome, but it dampens the politician’s incentive to work hard arising from the policy’s reputational concern. In such situations, the politician can still work hard due to career concern motivation or legacy effects or if somehow the voter can commit to a retrospective performance contingent reelection strategy — The issued that are not explicitly considered in our model.

4 The equilibrium analysis in the game with $T = \infty$

In the previous section, the two-period model did illustrate how imperfect information on policy effectiveness could generate an implicit incentive for the incumbent politician to respond to voters’ interests. Though the analysis in simple in two period model, it is a special case for several reason. First, the second period, being the last period, produces an extreme behavior. In an infinite repetition of the game, it can be possible to sustain responsive behavior over many periods. Second, in the infinitely repeated game, the question of policy selection (where the incumbent politician can implicitly choose a policy with certain $\pi$) brings additional effect. In any equilibrium, the policy chosen by the challenger is no longer a fixed alternative, rather a choice that can be sustained in equilibrium. In order to address these concerns, we analyze the infinitely repeated game.

We make two additional changes. Unlike the two period model, we now assume that players want to maximize the discounted sum of future payoffs where the discount factor is given by $\beta \in (0, 1)$. In addition, to sustain the implicit incentive in an infinitely repeated game setting, uncertainty about the policy’s effectiveness must be present in every period. We introduce a new parameter to incorporate this behavior. In particular, we assume a policy that was effective in the last period could be ineffective in the current period with some positive probability $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. So, even after acquiring perfect information about last period’s policy, the voter is unsure whether the policy will still be effective in the current period. This uncertainty has two implications in our setup. First, it directly reduces the expected value of a policy that was effective in the most recent period. As the resale value of the effective policy diminishes, the incumbent’s incentive to serve responsibly decreases. On the other hand, this strengthens the voter’s commitment to follow a strict punishment strategy of rewarding the incumbent only when a good outcome is realized. This behavior occurs because the policy’s expected value in the next period after observing a moderate outcome is reduced by a factor $\lambda$. Thus, the relative importance of an alternate policy increases even when there is a positive transition cost.

4.0.1 $t$–th period stage game

The $t$-th period starts with an election in which the voter decides whether to reelect the incumbent. Let $I_t$ denote the incumbent who held the office in the last period, and let $C_t$ denote the challenger. The winner of this election holds the office for the current period. He first decides whether to replace the previous period’s policy. The state variable, denoted by $\eta_t$, is the common belief that the last period’s policy is effective in the current period. Let $\phi_t$ denote the interim belief after the winner makes the decision whether to replace the previous
period’s policy. So, \( \phi_{t} \) equals \( \eta_{t} \) if the winner does not replace the previous period’s policy, and equals \( \pi \) otherwise. Next, the winner finally decides whether to serve responsibly. At the end of the period, the outcome is realized. Voters then update their belief that the current policy would remain effective in the next period; this new belief becomes the next period’s state value. In the infinite horizon setup we assume that the candidate wants to maximize the discounted sum of future payoffs where the discount factor is given by \( \beta \in (0, 1) \).

### 4.0.2 Markovian strategies

The belief \( \eta \) that the policy is effective is the players’ only payoff-relevant variable. Hence, the state of the game is defined as the voter’s belief that the policy is effective. A Markovian pure strategy for \( I_{t} \) is given by the mappings

\[
\begin{align*}
n_{i} &: [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \\
r_{i} &: [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}.
\end{align*}
\]

The mapping \( n_{i}(\eta) \) is the probability that last period’s policy is replaced by a new policy. The mapping \( r_{i}(\phi) \) is the probability of the office holder’s serving responsibly given the interim belief \( \phi \). Note that the choice of \( n_{i}(\eta) \) entirely determines the interim belief \( \phi \). If \( n_{i}(\eta) \) equals 0, then \( \phi \) equals \( \eta \); otherwise \( \phi \) equals \( \pi \). A Markovian pure strategy for \( C_{t} \) is given by the mappings:

\[
\begin{align*}
n_{c} &: [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \\
r_{c} &: [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}.
\end{align*}
\]

The mapping \( n_{c}(\eta) \) is the probability that the last period’s policy is replaced by a new policy. The mapping \( r_{c}(\phi) \) is the probability the office holder will serve responsibly given the interim belief \( \phi \). The only difference between these candidates is that \( C_{t} \) incurs zero cost to change the policy whereas \( I_{t} \) incurs a positive cost \( c_{p} > 0 \).

The voter’s Markovian pure strategy is given by the mapping

\[
v_{i} : [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\},
\]

where \( v_{i} \) is the probability of reelecting \( I_{t} \). The voter is considered to be myopic and maximizes only his next period payoff. By keeping the voter’s strategy as a function only of his interim belief, we implicitly assume that a candidate who starts the period with the state value \( \pi \) and decides to retain the policy will be treated the same as a candidate who starts with any different state value but changes the policy.

I use \( \psi(\phi(z)) \) to denote the voter’s posterior belief that the policy would be effective in the next period given the outcome \( z \) and the interim belief \( \phi \). In Markov perfect equilibrium, the candidates maximize the discounted sum of future payoffs; the voter, on the other hand, maximizes his return from the current period and uses Bayes’ rule to update the posterior probabilities.

**Definition.** A Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is the vector \((r_{i}, n_{i}, r_{c}, n_{c}, v, \eta)\) such that

- \( (r_{i}, n_{i}) \), \( (r_{c}, n_{c}) \), and \( v \) are payoff-maximizing strategies of the incumbent, the challenger, and the voters given others’ strategies.
- Beliefs are updated following Bayes’ rule:

\[
\psi(\phi(G)) = (1 - \lambda).
\]

11
\( ii \)
\[
\psi (\phi (M)) = \frac{(1-\lambda)\phi[r_k (\phi) (1-\mu) + (1-r_k (\phi))]}{\phi[r_k (\phi) (1-\mu) + (1-r_k (\phi))] + (1-\phi)\mu r_k (\phi)},
\]
where \( k \) denotes the candidate who is serving in the current period.

\( iii \)
\[
\psi (\phi (B)) = 0.
\]
For notational simplicity, we will denote \( \psi (\phi (z)) \) by \( \phi_z \) from now on. Note that if the leader serves corruptly in equilibrium, then the outcome \( G \) will not be reached with strictly positive probability. We assume that if the voter observes a good outcome when he expects the leader to serve corruptly, the voter assigns probability one to the event that the policy is effective.

### 4.1 The role of the imperfect observability of policy effect

Before illustrating how the implicit incentive is generated in the infinite horizon game, we address the benchmark case: Perfect observability of policy effectiveness. If policy effectiveness were perfectly observable at the end of the period \( t - 1 \), then at the beginning of the \( t \)-th period, the voter would know for sure whether the policy was effective in the last period. This fact implies two possible values for \( \eta_t \): 0 or \( (1-\lambda) \). Moreover, the incumbent’s action does not affect the voter’s posterior belief. Therefore, his continuation payoff from period \( t + 1 \), which depends only on the voter’s posterior belief, is independent of his action in the current period. This behavior implies that the winner of the election, regardless whether he is the incumbent or the challenger, will not incur the positive cost \( c_e \) of serving responsibly. Thus, the game merely boils down to the winner deciding in every period whether to change the policy and incurring the cost \( c_p \). In this game, there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which no leader serves responsibly. The following proposition describes the equilibrium behavior in the perfect observability case.

**Proposition 2.** In any Markov equilibrium, when the voter can perfectly observes policy effectiveness, the incumbent never changes the policy. If elected, neither the incumbent nor the challenger exerts any effort to serve responsibly.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

Notably, these properties can arise in many equilibria. In fact, for any \( \eta_0 \in (0,1-\lambda) \), there exists an equilibrium in which the voter uses the following reelection strategy:

\[
v (\eta) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \eta \geq \eta_0 \\
0 & \text{if } \eta < \eta_0 
\end{cases}
\]

This reelection strategy can be supported in an equilibrium in which the incumbent’s strategy is given by \( (n_i, r_i = 0) \), where \( n_i (0) = n_i = (1-\lambda) = 0 \), and \( n_i (\eta) \in \{0,1\} \) for all \( \eta \in (0,1-\lambda) \). Because \( \eta \) can take only two possible values - 0 and \( (1-\lambda) \) - and because \( v (0) = 0 \), the only values of the state variable at which the leader makes a move is \( (1-\lambda) \). For both the voter and the challenger, it is optimal not to change the policy at \( \eta = (1-\lambda) \).
4.2 Equilibrium analysis

4.2.1 Implicit incentive and disincentive for responsive behavior

If, at any state in an equilibrium, the voter expects leader to serve responsibly, then the leader must have an incentive to exert effort at that state value. If he serves responsibly at an interim belief, where the voter believes he’s serving responsibly, the leader’s payoff is

\[ b - c_e + \beta [\phi \mu V (\phi_G) + (\mu (1 - \phi) + \phi (1 - \mu)) V (\phi_M) + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi) V (\phi_B)]. \]  

(1)

If he deviates to serve corruptly when the voters believe he’s serving responsibly, his payoff is

\[ b + \beta [\phi V (\phi_M) + (1 - \phi) V (\phi_B)]. \]  

(2)

So, if at a state that can be reached along the equilibrium path with a positive probability that the leader serves responsibly, (1) must be greater than or equal to (2). After simplifying, this constraint can be written as

\[ \phi \mu V (\phi_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\phi)) V (\phi_M) - \mu (1 - \phi) V (\phi_B) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \geq 0. \]

For future reference, I will call this constraint the *incentive constraint*, and I will denote the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality by \( I(\phi) \).

Similarly, at any state in an equilibrium, if the voter expects the leader to serve corruptly then the leader must have an incentive for serving corruptly. If he serves corruptly and is expected to serve corruptly, his payoff is

\[ b + \beta [\phi V (\phi_M) + (1 - \phi) V (\phi_B)]. \]  

(3)

If instead he deviates to serve responsibly, his payoff is

\[ b - c_e + \beta [(\phi + \mu - \phi \mu) V (\phi_M) + (1 - \phi)(1 - \mu) V (\phi_B)]. \]  

(4)

Note that in this case, \( \phi_M = \phi_G = (1 - \lambda) \). Hence, the leader will stick to the corrupt behavior when the voter expects him to do so, if the expression in (3) is greater than the expression in (4). After simplifying, this constraint can be written as

\[ \mu (1 - \phi) V (\phi_G) - \mu (1 - \phi) V (\phi_B) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \leq 0. \]

We call this constraint the *disincentive constraint*, and we denote the left hand side of the above inequality by \( D(\phi) \).

4.2.2 The voter’s decision problem

The voter has to decide whether to reelect the incumbent before the incumbent leader moves. For any given interim belief \( \phi \), the voter always will strictly prefer the leader to serve responsibly; indeed, responsible service by the leader always increases the voter’s expected payoff given \( \phi \). Because the voter faces a transition cost \( c_t > 0 \) when electing a challenger, the voter strictly will prefer the incumbent leader rather than the challenger to change the policy when
the policy is no longer suiting his interests. To determine when a policy change is optimal for the voter, we compare his expected benefit from the two action profiles: \((n_i = 0, r_i = 1)\) and \((n_i = 1, r_i = 1)\). His expected benefit from the action profile \((n_i = 0, r_i = 1)\) at state \(\eta\) is

\[
2\eta \mu + \mu (1 - \eta) + \eta (1 - \mu)
\]

and his expected benefit from the action profile \((n_i = 1, r_i = 1)\) at state \(\eta\) is

\[
2\pi \mu + \mu (1 - \pi) + \pi (1 - \mu)
\]

Comparing these benefits, we see that the voter would prefer a policy change if and only if \(\eta < \pi\) (given \(r_i = 1\)). Hence, the voter’s first-best would be to induce the incumbent leader to follow the strategy \((n_i = 0, r_i = 1)\) if \(\eta < \pi\) and to follow \((n_i = 1, r_i = 1)\) if \(\pi \leq \eta\). If \(\eta < \pi\), then the voter’s interest will conflict with the incumbent’s only with regard to his decision to run the office responsibly. However, if \(\eta \geq \pi\), then the voter’s interest will conflict with the incumbent leader’s both in terms of the incumbent’s decision to change the existing policy and his decision to serve responsibly.

The following two results describe the voter’s behavior in any Markov equilibrium of the game. The first lemma suggests that if, in any equilibrium, the incumbent changes the policy at a state \(\eta\), then the voter must have set a reelection probability of 1 at that state; indeed, if the incumbent changes the policy, the interim belief changes from \(\eta\) to \(\pi\). At \(\pi\), on the other hand, the incumbent leader faces the same incentives as the challenger, so his optimal action would be the same as the action followed by the challenger. This situation implies that the voter would receive a higher expected utility from reelecting the incumbent; reelecting the incumbent allows the voter to save the transition cost of electing the challenger.

**Lemma 1.** In any equilibrium, if at any state \(\eta\), the incumbent replaces the policy (or, \(n_i(\eta) = 1\)), then the voter must reelect the incumbent (or, \(v(\eta) = 1\)).

**Proof.** See Appendix.

The following lemma suggests that we can effectively restrict our attention only to the class of monotonically increasing strategies by the voter.

**Lemma 2.** In any Markov equilibrium, the voter’s strategy must be monotonically increasing in \(\eta\).

**Proof.** See Appendix.

### 4.2.3 First-best is never achievable

The voter can never achieve the first-best outcome as no Markov equilibrium in pure strategy will ever exist where the incumbent leader would change the policy. So, if \(\eta < \pi - c_t\), the voter cannot control the incumbent’s decision to replace or maintain the ineffective policy. Even if the voter could possibly implement a new policy by electing the challenger, he would incur a cost of \(c_t\). The argument for proving this result follows.

From Lemma 2, we see that the voter’s strategy in any equilibrium would be either (i) \(v(\eta)\) equals 1 for all \(\eta\) or (ii) \(v(\eta)\) equals 0 if and only if \(\eta < \eta_0\) for some \(\eta_0 \in (0, 1 - \lambda)\). In the first case, the incumbent will not exert any costly effort because his action no longer affect
his reelection probability. However, the voter’s payoff from electing the challenger is $\pi - c_t$; hence he must receive at least this much utility at any $\eta$. This kind of equilibrium therefore survives only if $\pi - c_t \leq 0$. On the other hand, when the voter uses a cutoff strategy that is increasing in $\eta$, there is no equilibrium with $n_i(\eta) = 1$: If for some $\eta$, $n_i(\eta) = 1$, the leader’s continuation payoff must be as high as the persistence cost $c_p$. In proving the theorem, I show that the incentive to change the policy, given any monotonically increasing reelection rule set by the voter, is maximized at $\eta = 0$. So, if for some $\eta$, $n_i(\eta) = 1$, then the leader will have an incentive to change the policy at $\eta = 0$. In that case, however, the voter would be better off reelecting the leader at $\eta = 0$. We therefore arrive at the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.** There is no Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the incumbent replaces the existing policy with a strictly positive probability at any state that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path.

This proposition does not mean that the implicit incentive to induce a responsive behavior from the leader would disappear. However, this does suggest that the voter could never achieve the first-best in this scenario. When $\eta < \pi - c_t$, the voter could not make the incumbent leader change the existing policy. Notably, this result does not depend on the magnitude of the persistence cost.

### 4.2.4 Responsive equilibrium and other equilibria

**Definition.** A responsive equilibrium is a Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the leader serves the office responsibly at every state $\eta$ that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path. A non responsive equilibrium is any equilibrium that is not a responsive equilibrium. A corrupt equilibrium is a Markov equilibrium in pure strategies where the leaders serve the office corruptly at every state $\eta$ that can be reached with a positive probability along the equilibrium path.

Any corrupt equilibrium is therefore a non responsive equilibrium. Note that if the transition cost is high, the voter’s ability to control the incumbent’s behavior decreases as his payoff from the alternate option, that is, electing the challenger, decreases with the transition cost. The voter’s maximum expected payoff from electing the challenger is $\pi + \mu - c_t$. This follows since the voter receives 2 if the outcome $G$ is realized, which has the probability of occurrence $\pi\mu$ if the challenger exerts effort in equilibrium, and the voter receives 1 if the outcome $M$ is realized, which has the probability of occurrence $\pi(1 - \mu) + \mu(1 - \pi)$ after incurring the transition cost $c_t$. Hence, if $\pi - c_t < 0$, the voter has no incentive to reelect the challenger in any scenario. However, for sufficiently low values of the cost of effort, there will always be a responsive equilibrium.

**Proposition 4.** If the transition cost $c_t$ is greater than $\pi + \mu$, there will be no responsive equilibria. If the transition cost $c_t$ is less than or equals $\pi + \mu$, then for any $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, there exists a constant $\tau_e(\lambda) > 0$ such that for every level of cost of effort $c_e$ less than that the constant $\tau_e$, (or, $0 \leq c_e < \tau_e$), there will be a responsive equilibrium.

---

4Note the difference in voter’s payoff from electing the challenger, compared to the same in the two period game. In the two period game, the challenger puts no effort in the second period, and thus $V$’s expected benefit is not affected by $\mu$ there.
Sketch of the proof: The above discussion suggests that if \( \pi + \mu - c_t < 0 \), then the voter will always elect the leader with probability 1. This reasoning implies that the leader will have a constant long-term value function that is independent of the state value \( \eta \). The incentive constraint \( I(\eta) \) and the disincentive constraint \( D(\eta) \) will not be satisfied if the long-term value function is constant, however. Therefore, in this equilibrium, the implicit incentive for responsive behavior is absent; if the voter does not expect the leader to exert any effort, the leader’s optimal action would be to avoid exerting any effort. To prove the second part, we first see that for any given \( \lambda \), there exists \( \tau_e > 0 \) such that the incentive constraint is satisfied in a range of \( \eta \in [\eta_0, 1 - \lambda] \). So, if the voter sets the reelection strategy as \( v(\eta) = 1 \) if and only if \( \eta \geq \eta_0 \), then for all possible values of \( \eta \) at which the incumbent is elected, the leader will face the incentive that induces responsive behavior. Moreover, for all \( c < \tau_e \), the same condition holds, implying that a responsive equilibrium will occur for any such \( c \).

It is easy to verify that as \( \lambda \) increases, the cutoff value \( \tau_e(\lambda) \) decreases. For a low value of \( \lambda \), the set of values of \( \tau_e \) that can satisfy the equality \( I(\eta) \geq 0 \) is a subset of the set of the values of \( \tau_e \) that satisfy the same inequality for a high value of \( \lambda \).

**Corollary 1.** As \( \lambda \) increases, \( \tau_e(\lambda) \) decreases.

Note that if a responsive equilibrium exists, then we must have \( v(0) = 0 \). As from Lemma 2, we already know that if \( v(0) = 1 \), then \( v(\eta) = 1 \) for all \( \eta \). But then the leader’s long-term value function would be independent of \( \eta \). This fact implies that the leader will have no incentive to take any costly action; more specifically, he will have no incentive for responsive behavior along the equilibrium path. But this kind of equilibrium can survive only if the payoff from electing a challenger is negative even when the challenger is not working. The condition that determines the existence of such an equilibrium is \( \pi - c_t < 0 \). If \( \pi \leq c_t \leq \pi + \mu \), in addition to the corrupt equilibria mentioned above, there will be responsive equilibria, which are unique in the voter’s following strategy:

\[
v(\eta) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \eta \geq \pi - c_t \\
0 & \text{if } \eta < \pi - c_t 
\end{cases}
\]

The uniqueness property is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix. However, the number of equilibria that can be supported is infinite. In particular, for any \( c < \tau_e \), there will be one such equilibrium.

The above proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of responsive equilibria. The expression \( \pi + \mu - c_t \) is the expected payoff from electing the challenger when he is committed to exert effort in equilibrium. If \( \pi + \mu - c_t < 0 \), a corrupt equilibrium is the only possible equilibrium in which no candidate exerts any effort at any state in equilibrium. The state-path of this dynamic game is a stochastic process where at any period \( t \), the state value can be either 1 - \( \lambda \) or 0 with probabilities \( \eta \) and \( 1 - \eta \) respectively, given the last period state value \( \eta \). It is evident that 0 is an absorbing state here.

If \( \pi + \mu - c_t \geq 0 \), both kinds of equilibria exist. In any responsive equilibrium, the voter must not reelect the incumbent if a bad outcome occurred in the last period. But, a corrupt equilibrium may exist in which the voter does reelect the incumbent even after a bad outcome occurred in the last period. Let us first find out the condition where the voter would reelect the incumbent after a bad outcome occurred, and therefore, the incumbent can not commit to exert any effort. Since the voter is following a monotone strategy in equilibrium,
if he reelects the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period, he must reelect the incumbents at every state. If instead, he elects the challenger, in equilibrium, he can at least get $\pi - c_t$. Moreover, in this kind of equilibrium, the challenger cannot commit to exert any effort as the voter’s reelection strategy in the following period does not depend on the current period outcome. Therefore, a corrupt equilibrium exists in which the voter always reelect the incumbent if and only if $\pi - c_t \leq 0$.

**Proposition 5.** A corrupt equilibrium in which the voter always reelect the incumbent exists if and only if the probability of effectiveness of an untested policy $\pi$ is less than or equals the transition cost $c_t$ (or, $\pi \leq c_t$).

Comparing the above result with proposition 4, we see that both responsive equilibrium and corrupt equilibrium exist if $c_t < \pi$, the condition $c_t \leq \pi$ is also a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium where the voter reelects the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period. If $c_t < \pi$, by electing the challenger the voter can at least get a strictly positive payoff $\pi - c_t$. If he reelects the incumbent after a bad outcome occurred he gets zero payoff. Because if an equilibrium exists and the incumbent gets reelected following a bad outcome, he will not exert any effort. The voter’s payoff by reelecting the incumbent in any equilibrium following a bad outcome will be 0. Thus, if $c_t < \pi$, in any equilibrium the voter must not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period. Proposition 4 says that for sufficiently low cost of effort, responsive equilibria exist.

To find other equilibria that may exist in this case, we study the relation between the incentive constraint $I(\phi)$ and disincentive constraint $D(\phi)$. If the voter does not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome, then in any equilibrium, the incumbent’s long term value function $V$ at $\phi_B = 0$ would be 0. This property implies that the value function is a strictly increasing function in the posterior belief $\phi$ for all $\phi$ at which $V(\phi) > 0$.

**Lemma 3.** If in an equilibrium the voter does not reelect the incumbent following a bad outcome in the last period, the long term continuation payoff of the incumbent is zero when the posterior belief equals zero and it is strictly increasing in the posterior belief at all posterior belief in which the long term payoff is strictly positive.

**Proof.** In appendix.

From lemma 3, we can rewrite the incentive constraint and the disincentive constraint as

$$I(\phi) = \phi \mu V(\phi_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\phi)) V(\phi_M) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \geq 0$$

and,

$$D(\phi) = \mu (1 - \phi) V(\phi_G) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \leq 0.$$ 

Since $V(\phi_M) \in [0, V(\phi_G)]$, $I(\phi)$ is strictly less than $D(\phi)$. Hence at some posterior belief $\phi$, if the incentive constraint is satisfied, the disincentive constraint will not be satisfied. This fact implies that if there is a responsive equilibria for a specific set of parameter values, no non responsive equilibrium can exist for the same set of parameter values. Furthermore, $D(\phi)$ is decreasing in the posterior belief $\phi$. Hence, if in an equilibrium at some posterior belief $\phi$, the voter believes that the candidate will not exert any effort, then at any posterior belief $\phi' > \phi$, the candidate does not have any incentive to exert effort. Combining these two facts together, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 6. When the probability of effectiveness of an untested policy $\pi$ is greater than the transition cost $c_t$ (or, $c_t < \pi$), if a responsive equilibrium exists for a given set of parameter values, no non-responsive equilibrium exists for the same set of parameter values.

Proof. In appendix.

Therefore if a responsive equilibria exists when the transition cost is less than the probability of effectiveness of an untested policy, that responsive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in that setting. Combining this result with the results from proposition 4, we see that for low values of transition cost, there exists a unique responsive equilibrium.

5 Concluding remarks

Unobservability of policy effectiveness plays a pivotal role in generating implicit incentives for leaders to serve responsibly. Underlying this result is the electorate’s expectations for a leader’s performance; by not performing, the leader weakens the voter’s belief in the policy’s effectiveness. In the infinite horizon game, We show that as long as some amount of uncertainty surrounds the policy’s effectiveness, this implicit incentive can last in every period. As uncertainty decreases, however, the condition required for existence of a responsive equilibrium becomes stringent. If the cost of transition is less than the probability of an untested policy’s effectiveness, then this responsive equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, this analysis suggests that even if the implicit incentive induces the leader to exert costly effort, it fails to control the policy properly, even when voters perceive the policy to be ineffective ex ante.
6 Appendix

Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] In the two-period game, no player is going to take any costly action in the second period. This means that the incumbent if elected, is going to stick to the existing policy and serve corruptly and the challenger is going serve corruptly, too. However, if the challenger continues with the existing policy in any equilibrium, the voter is not going to elect him as he incurs a positive transition cost to elect the challenger. Therefore, if in any equilibrium, the voter elects the challenger, the challenger changes the policy. The expected benefit to the voter of electing the challenger is therefore \( \pi - c_t \). Let \( \eta_o(R) \) and \( \eta_o(C) \) denote the posterior probability that the policy is effective after observing an outcome \( o \), given responsive behavior and corrupt behavior by the politician respectively. Clearly, \( \eta_G(R) = \eta_G(C) = 1 - \eta_B(R) = 1 - \eta_B(C) = 1 \). When the incumbent serves responsibly, then

\[
\eta_M(R) = \frac{\pi (1 - \mu)}{\pi (1 - \mu) + \mu (1 - \pi)}.
\]

If the candidate serves corruptly, then

\[
\eta_M(C) = 1.
\]

Since \( \eta_G(R) \geq \eta_M(R) \geq \eta_B(R) \) and \( \eta_G(C) \geq \eta_M(C) \geq \eta_B(C) \), if the voter reelects the incumbent after observing any specific outcome, it must reelect the incumbent after observing a better outcome. Thus, we can restrict our attention to cutoff relection strategies. Let \( v_1 \) denote the strategy by the voter where the voter reelects the incumbent only if \( o = G \). Similarly, \( v_2 \) and \( v_3 \) are defined as strategies by the voter where the voter reelects the incumbent only if \( o = G \) or \( M \), and if \( o = G, M \) or \( B \). In any responsive equilibria, if \( \pi < c_t \), then the voter is going to choose the strategy \( v_3 \). However, if the voter chooses the strategy \( v_3 \), the incumbent’s dominant action in period 1 would be to serve corruptly. Hence, if \( \pi < c_t \), no responsive equilibrium exists. If \( c_t \leq \pi \) and \( \pi - c_t \leq \eta_M(R) \), then the voter’s optimal strategy is \( v_2 \) in any responsive equilibrium. In the first period, the incumbent by serving responsibly, gets a payoff

\[
b - c_c + (1 - (1 - \pi) (1 - \mu))b.
\]

Instead, if he serves corruptly in the first period, he gets

\[
b + \pi b.
\]

Comparing the above payoffs, we find that the incumbent acts responsibly if

\[
\frac{b}{c} \geq \frac{1}{\mu(1-\pi)}.
\]

If \( \eta_e(M) < \pi - c_t \) then the voter cannot commit to a strategy where he reelects the incumbent when a moderate outcome is realized. Therefore, the voter takes the most severe punishment strategy \( v_1 \). When the voter takes \( v_1 \), by serving responsibly, the incumbent gets

\[
b - c_c + \pi \mu b.
\]

If he serves corruptly, then the voter’s payoff is \( (b + c) \). Comparing these payoffs, we find that the incumbent serves corruptly if

\[
\frac{b}{c} \geq \frac{1}{\mu \pi}.
\]

Finally, let us determine the condition when no \( C \) equilibrium exists. In any \( C \) equilibrium, the voter always reelects the incumbent if \( o = G \) or \( M \). Hence, by serving responsibly, the candidate gets

\[
b - c_c + (1 - (1 - \pi) (1 - \mu))b.
\]
By serving corruptly, he gets

\[ b + \pi b. \]

Therefore, the candidate deviates to serve responsibly if \( b - c_e + (1 - (1 - \pi)(1 - \mu))b \geq b + \pi b, \)

which gives our final result in proposition 1.

Proof. [Proof of Proposition 2] The second part is easy to see as the leader’s action does not affect the value of the state variable, hence he has no incentive to put in any costly effort. To see the first part, note that if any equilibrium exists, then we must have \( v(0) = 0 \) if \( \pi - c_t > 0 \), that is the voter rejects the incumbent if \( \eta_t = 0 \). Otherwise, if the incumbent is elected when \( \eta = 0 \), he has no incentive to change the policy at \( \eta = 0 \). At \( \eta = 0 \), if the policy is not changed, there will be no updating at that state since the bad outcome will be realized in subsequent periods, and by the Markov assumption, this is an absorbing state. The leader will get a continuation payoff of \( b/(1 - \beta) \), which is the maximum possible payoff he can achieve. However, in that case the voter has incentive to replace him if \( \pi - c_t > 0 \). Therefore if any equilibrium exists and if \( \pi - c_t > 0 \), we have \( v(0) = 0 \). Moreover, this implies if any equilibrium exists, we must have \( n_i(0) = 0 \), since otherwise the voter would elect the incumbent at \( \eta = 0 \), contradicting that \( v(0) = 0 \). At any \( \eta \), the leaders long term payoff function if he does not change the policy, is given by

\[ b + \beta \eta V(1 - \lambda) \]

where \( V(\phi) \) is the value function of the leader when the value of the state variable is \( \phi \). On the other hand, by changing the policy he gets

\[ b - c_p + \beta \pi V(1 - \lambda). \]

So, he will have no incentive to change the policy at \( \eta \) if \( (\pi - \eta) < \frac{c_p}{\beta V(1 - \lambda)} \). As, \( 1 - \lambda \) is assumed to be greater than \( \pi \), the voter will not change the policy if the policy is effective. Finally the voter’s expected payoff from electing the challenger is \( \pi - c_t \), and he is going to elect the challenger if \( \eta < \pi - c_t \) at any \( \eta \) that can be reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path. Only two values of \( \eta \) will be reached, namely, 0 and \( (1 - \lambda) \). Therefore in any equilibrium, along the equilibrium path, the policy will not be changed by the incumbent.

Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] If possible, let us assume that \( v(\eta) = 0 \) for some \( \eta \) with \( n_i(\eta) = 1 \). This implies that the voter’s payoff from electing the challenger is more than the payoff from reelecting the incumbent. Since not reelecting the incumbent is a costly action to the voter, this is possible only if \( r_c(\pi) = 1 \) and \( r_i(\pi) = 0 \) in equilibrium. However, by setting \( r_c(\pi) = 1 \), the challenger incurs a positive cost \( c_c \). This suggests that the challenger has a positive incentive to serve responsibly at \( \pi \). Since his incentive to serve responsibly only depends on the interim belief \( \pi \), and since the incumbent leader faces the same set of incentives the challenger faces, this implies that the incumbent would also choose \( r_i(\pi) = 1 \). But given \( n_i(\pi) = 1 \), \( r_i(\pi) = 1 \), the voter is strictly better off by choosing \( v(\eta) = 1 \). Contradiction.
for every $\mu V$. Note that if responsive equilibria, we must have the voter’s strategy in this kind of equilibrium will look like the text of the paper, in any responsive equilibrium we must have. Here I will prove the second part of the proposition by construction. First note that, as argued in the

Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] Suppose there exist $\eta_1$ and $\eta_2$ with $\eta_1 < \eta_2$ such that $1 = v(\eta_1) > v(\eta_2) = 0$. From Lemma 1, we know that $n_i(\eta_2)$ must be equal to 0. I first claim that $n_i(\eta_1)$ also has to be equal to 0. If we have $n_i(\eta_1) = 1$, which means that the incumbent replaces the policy at $\eta_1$, then the continuation payoff of the incumbent at the interim belief $\pi$ must be greater than the transition cost $c_t$. However, since the transition cost does not depend on the value of the state variable this implies that at $\eta_2$, the incumbent leader’s payoff at $\eta_2$ from following $(n_i = 1)$ is strictly positive. However, in that case the voter is strictly better off by choosing $v(\eta_2)$ to be equal to 1. Hence we must have $n_i(\eta_1) = 0$. Furthermore, given $n_i(\eta_1) = 0$, $n_i(\eta_2) = 0$, and $v(\eta_1) = 1$, $v(\eta_2) = 0$, it must be the case $1 = r_i(\eta_1) > r_i(\eta_2) = 0$. However, if in equilibrium $r_i(\eta_2) = 0$, then the disincentive constraint must be satisfied at $\eta_2$, contradicting that the incentive constraint is satisfied at $\eta_1$.

Proof. [Proof of Proposition 3] From Lemma 2, we know that the voter’s strategy in any equilibrium must be of the following form:

$$v(\eta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \eta \geq \eta_0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \eta < \eta_0 \end{cases}.$$ 

If $\eta_0 = 0$ or $\eta_G = 1 - \lambda$, then the candidates will not take any costly action in any period as their action will not affect their reelection probability. So consider the case when $\eta_0 \in (0, 1 - \lambda)$. Moreover, if possible, suppose at some $\eta' \geq \eta_0$, the incumbent replaces the policy, it implies that his continuation payoff at the belief $\pi$ (since after replacement, the interim belief changes to $\pi'$) exceeds the persistence cost $c_p$, or $V(\pi') - c_p \geq \max(V(\eta'), 0)$. Moreover, this continuation payoff is a function of $\pi$ only, and therefore is independent of $\eta$. Therefore at any $\eta < \eta'$, the incumbent would actually be better off by replacing the policy since $V$ is decreasing in $\eta$. However, from Lemma 2, we see that in that case the voter would always reward the incumbent with reelection, contradicting that $\eta_0 > 0$.

Proof. [Proof of Proposition 4] It is easy to see why no responsive equilibria exists if $\pi + \mu - c_t < 0$. Here I will prove the second part of the proposition by construction. First note that, as argued in the text of the paper, in any responsive equilibrium we must have $v(0) = 0$. From lemma 2, we know that the voter’s strategy in this kind of equilibrium will look like

$$v(\eta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \eta \geq \eta_0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \eta < \eta_0 \end{cases}.$$ 

The incumbent leader therefore has to make a move only at $\eta \in [\eta_0, 1 - \lambda]$. In order to sustain the responsive equilibria, we must have $I(\eta) > 0$ for all $\eta \in [\eta_0, 1 - \lambda]$ where $I(\eta)$ is given by

$$\eta \mu V(\eta_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\eta)) V(\eta_M) - \mu (1 - \eta) V(\eta B) - \frac{c_t}{\beta} \geq 0.$$ 

Note that if $v(0) = 0$, then $V(0) = 0$. This implies that the left hand side of the inequality becomes $\phi \eta \mu V(\eta_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\eta)) V(\eta_M) - \frac{c_t}{\beta} \geq 0$. As $\eta \mu V(\eta_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\eta)) V(\eta_M)$ is always positive for every $\eta \in [0, 1]$, there exists $\tau_\xi > 0$ such that the inequality is satisfied for all $c_t < \tau_\xi$. Moreover, by setting $\eta_0 + \mu$ to the payoff by electing the challenger, we get that $\eta_0 = \pi - c_t$.

Proof. [Proof of Proposition 5] Case1: $\pi + \mu \leq c_t$.

The maximum possible payoff that the voter can get by electing the challenger is $2\pi \mu + \pi (1 - \mu) + \mu (1 - \pi)$, which is $\pi + \mu$. But he incurs a cost $c_t$ to make this transition. Hence, his net payoff is
\[\pi + \mu - c_t.\] If his net payoff is negative, the voter will not elect the challenger for any belief \(\phi.\) Given the voter’s strategy to reelect the incumbent with probability 1 at any belief, the incumbent’s optimal action will be not exerting effort.

**Case 2:** \(\pi \leq c_t < \pi + \mu.\)

In this situation, if in an equilibrium the challenger can commit to exert effort after his election, the voter’s net payoff will be positive. I show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the challenger fails to commit to exert any effort. Therefore, the voter’s net payoff from electing the challenger will be \(\pi - c_t,\) which is negative. Consider a strategy profile, in which the voter reelects the incumbent at any belief \(\phi.\) If the voter follows this strategy, the challenger, if elected, will have no incentive to exert effort. By exerting effort, he incurs a cost \(c_e;\) but his probability of reelection does not change. Therefore, given this strategy followed by the voter, the challenger cannot commit to exert effort. On the other hand, if the challenger does not exert effort, the voter’s strategy to elect the incumbent at any posterior is rational, since his payoff from electing the challenger is negative. Therefore, this equilibrium exists as long as \(\pi \leq c_t.\) In this equilibrium, no candidate exerts effort at any stage. The voter always reelect incumbent with probability 1.

**Case 3:** \(c_t < \pi.\)

We need to show that there does not exist any corrupt equilibrium in which the voter always reelect the incumbent with probability 1 at any posterior. To see this, let us assume, if possible, the converse is true. However, if the voter always reelects the incumbent, then the incumbent will not take any costly action at any stage. But then by electing the challenger, the voter gets \(\pi - c_t,\) which is strictly positive. When the belief is low (less than \(\pi - c_t\)), reelecting the incumbent is not rational strategy for the voter. Hence contradiction.

**Proof.** [Proof of Lemma 3] Note that the posterior belief about the policy effectiveness after observing a bad outcome is 0 (or, \(\eta_B = 0\) at any \(\eta\)). If the voter does not reelect the incumbent after observing a bad outcome, we have \(v (0) = 0.\) Hence, in an equilibrium in which the incumbent exerts effort at some belief \(\eta,\) his long term value function is given by

\[V (\eta) = v (\eta) \left[ b - c_e + \beta [\eta \mu V (\eta_G) + (\eta (1 - \mu) + \mu (1 - \eta)) V (\eta_M)] \right].\]

On the other hand, in an equilibrium in which the incumbent does not exert effort at some belief \(\eta,\) his long term value function is given by

\[V (\eta) = v (\eta) \left[ b + \beta \eta V (\eta_G) \right].\]

If \(v (\eta) = 0,\) we have \(V (\eta) = 0.\) If \(v (\eta) > 0,\) in the first case, the solution to this Bellman equation is an increasing function of \(\eta,\) since...

In the second case, if \(v (\eta) > 0,\) we can solve for the functional form of \(V (\eta),\) which is given by

\[V (\eta) = b + \beta \eta V (\eta_G); \quad V (\eta_G) = \frac{b}{1 - \beta \eta}.\]

\(V (\eta)\) is strictly increasing in \(\eta.\)

**Proof.** [Proof of Proposition 6] If \(c_t < \pi,\) the voter must reject the incumbent in any equilibrium. This result follows from Proposition 5. From Lemma 3, we see that if the voter rejects the incumbent
following a bad outcome, then $v(0) = 0$ and $V(\eta)$ is an increasing function in $\eta$. Combining these two facts, we can rewrite the incentive and disincentive constraints at some belief $\phi$ as

$$I(\phi) = \phi \mu V(\phi_G) + (\mu (1 - 2\phi)) V(\phi_M) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \geq 0$$

and,

$$D(\phi) = \mu (1 - \phi) V(\phi_G) - \frac{c_e}{\beta} \leq 0.$$  

Since $V(\phi_G) > V(\phi_M)$ for any belief $\phi$ we have $I(\phi) < D(\phi)$ for every $\phi$. In a responsive equilibrium exists, $I(\phi) \geq 0$ at every $\phi$ that will be reached in equilibrium with positive probability. Hence, $D(\phi) > 0$ at every $\phi$ that will be reached with positive probability in that equilibrium. Moreover, $D(\phi)$ is a decreasing function of $\phi$. So if $D(\phi) > 0$ at some $\phi$, then at every $\phi' < \phi$, $D(\phi') > 0$. Now consider a typical responsive equilibrium for a given set of parameter values. The voter takes a cutoff strategy of reelecting the incumbent if and only if $\eta > \eta_0$ for some $\eta_0 \in (0, 1 - \lambda]$. If $I(\eta) \geq 0$ at every $\eta \in (0, 1 - \lambda]$, then $D(\eta) > 0$ at at every $\eta \in (0, 1 - \lambda]$. Moreover, since $D(\eta)$ is decreasing in $\eta$, it implies that $D(\eta) > 0$ at every $\eta \in [0, 1 - \lambda]$. Hence, no non responsive equilibrium can exist for the same set of parameter values. □
References


