Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and to make joint deviations. They both consider a case in which any coalition can be formed. Be that as it may, there are many real life examples where some coalitions/subcoalitions cannot be formed. Furthermore, when all coalitions are formed, there may occur *conflicts of interest* such that a player is not able to choose an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of two coalitions that he/she is a member of. Stemming from these criticisms, we study an *organizational framework* where some coalitions/subcoalitions are not formed and where the coalitional structure are formulated in such a way that there remain no conflicts of interest. We define an *organization* as an ordered collection of partitions of the set of players in such a way that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For a given organization, we introduce the notion of *organizational Nash equilibrium*. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games.