Tuesday 11
Session Claude Fluet - Experimental Economics : Laws, Norms, and Morality
Claude Fluet
› 14:00 - 14:30 (30min)
› 402
Tax evasion under Oath
Nicolas Jacquemet  1@  , Stéphane Luchini, Antoine Malezieux  2@  , Jason Shogren@
1 : Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics  (EEP-PSE)  -  Website
Ecole d'Économie de Paris
48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris -  France
2 : Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée  (BETA)  -  Website
université de Strasbourg, CNRS : UMR7522, Université Nancy II
P E G E 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 STRASBOURG CEDEX -  France

This paper studies the e ect of commitment based on the truth-telling-oath developed by Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, and Shogren (2013) on tax compliance decisions. In a Baseline condition, participants play a classical tax evasion game without audits. In an Oath condition, the participants are rst o ered to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath, before playing the same tax evasion game. Results show that in Experiment 1, compliance increases by one third under oath compared to the Baseline. Experiment 2 reproduces this result and highlights for the rst time in the literature that the oath e ect could be due to a change of taxpayers' preferences towards honest or dishonest scal declarations.

 

Please note that this paper is an invited paper for Claude Fluet's session.

 

 


Online user: 1