Tuesday 11
Game theory
Kerim Keskin
› 11:30 - 12:00 (30min)
› 601
The first follower effect in a public good game
Edward Cartwright  1@  , Denise Lovett, Anna Stepanova@
1 : University of Kent

A successful leader needs followers, and so the actions of the first follower can prove critical. We explore the role of first followers in a linear public good setting by contrasting four games that differ in the timing of investments. The standard leader and sequential games are compared with a first follower game, where the first follower acts as a bridge between the leader and subsequent followers, and a shared leader game, where there are two leaders. Theoretical results are provided detailing conditions under which expected investment is highest in the first follower game. We then provide the results of an experimental study where total investment is highest in the first follower game.


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